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Coalition Committee 
Aaron Klein* 
Jake E. Marcus** 
This note explores the past, present, and future of the 
path for Cuban baseball players into MLB. Specifically, this 
note will explore the late-2014 agreement between the 
United States and Cuba to normalize relations and its antic-
ipated impact on MLB. Part I provides an extensive histori-
cal context of the relationship between the two countries 
with a focus on the effect that baseball has had on the rela-
tionship. Part II draws attention to MLB’s current policies 
and the resulting hardships faced by Cuban baseball players 
embark on the journey from Serie Nacional to MLB. Part III 
concentrates on the legal issues arising out of the circuitous 
emigration process for Cuban baseball players to make 
MLB. Part IV outlines the wealth of literature on Cuban 
baseball and details the proposed solutions offered by other 
scholars on the matter. Part V explains the development of 
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the normalization agreement between the United States and 
Cuba and predicts its impact on MLB. Finally, Part V pro-
poses framework to enhance the safety involved with the em-
igration process and efficiency of the troubling issue while 
utilizing the normalized relations platform to align incen-
tives for Cuba and the United States. 
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On June 28, 2012, the Los Angeles Dodgers reached a seven-
year-agreement worth $42 million with Cuban-born-turned-Mexi-
can-resident Yasiel Puig.1 After a little less than a year, Puig made 
his Major League debut in the Dodger-blue on June 2, 2013.2 Im-
mediately, he took the league by storm. For the month of June, Puig 
earned both the National League Rookie of the Month and National 
League Player of the Month awards, marking the first time in Major 
League Baseball (“MLB”) history a player had done so in their de-
but month.3 Puig continued to dazzle the world of baseball through-
out the season, making highlight catches in the outfield, hitting 
mammoth home runs, and displaying one of the strongest throwing 
arms in the entire league. Despite playing in only 104 games, Puig 
finished second in the National League Rookie of the Year voting 
behind fellow Cuban José Fernández.4 
Throughout the season, the Cuban outfielder was an enigma. 
Along with headlines about his play on the field came rumblings 
regarding the circumstances of his escape from Cuba. This led to a 
sea of rumors—that he was a spy for the Cuban government, that he 
continued to face death threats from those that helped him escape, 
and that he had betrayed his fellow countrymen in exchange for free-
dom.5 On the eve of the 2014 MLB season, two reporters—Jesse 
                                                                                                             
 1 Jesse Sanchez, Dodgers Sign Cuban Puig to Seven-Year Deal, THE 
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (June 29, 2012), http://m.dodg-
ers.mlb.com/news/article/34081436/ [hereinafter Sanchez]. 
 2 Austin Laymance, Pair of Homers Plus Puig’s Defense Lift Dodgers, THE 
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (June 4, 2013, 2:47 AM), 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/gameday/in-
dex.jsp?gid=2013_06_03_sdnmlb_lanmlb_1&mode=recap_home&c_id=la. 
 3 Andrew Simon, Puig Naps NL Player, Rookie Awards for June, THE 
OFFICIAL SITE OF THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS (July. 3, 2013), http://m.dodg-
ers.mlb.com/news/article/52580416/dodgers-outfielder-yasiel-puig-nl-player-of-
the-month-nl-rookie-of-the-month. 
 4 Historic Win for Cuban Jose Fernandez, BASEBALL WRITERS’ 
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, http://bbwaa.com/13-nl-roy/ (last visited Feb. 17, 
2015). 
 5 Jesse Katz, Escape from Cuba: Yasiel Puig’s Untold Journey to the Dodg-
ers, LOS ANGELES MAGAZINE (Apr. 14, 2014), http://www.lamag.com/long-
form/escape-from-cuba-yasiel-puigs-untold-journey-to-the-dodgers/2/. 
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Katz of Los Angeles Magazine6 and Scott Eden of ESPN The Mag-
azine7—unearthed Puig’s surreptitious journey. 
The story began just before sunrise on a day in late April 2012.8 
After four foiled attempts, Puig, just twenty-one at the time, set out 
on his fifth attempt to escape Cuba.9 Along with his close friend, his 
girlfriend, and a padrino (Puig’s Santerian spirit guide), Puig scaled 
some of the most isolated stretches of land in the world along the 
Cuban coast, accessible only by foot.10 Evading heavily armed Cu-
ban police on numerous occasions over the course of thirty-hours, 
the group met their smugglers on a remote dock. The smugglers took 
the group to Isla Mujeres, an island east of Cancun, where the Puig 
crew was held in the equivalent of a low-security prison, waiting for 
an American contact to post their smuggling fee. One night, how-
ever, a rival crew arranged for the crew’s kidnapping by bribing El 
Comando de Cancun, the Cancun police. The new Puig smugglers 
arranged for the group to establish residency in Cancun, only after 
bribing Cancun officials, of course. After a tryout in front of numer-
ous MLB teams, Puig agreed to the seven-year pledge with the 
Dodgers. 
While players from countries such as the Dominican Republic 
and Japan have made the transition to the MLB with relative ease, 
sadly, these near-death stories, tales of failed attempts to flee, run-
ins with Cuban police, kidnappings, briberies, forgeries, and money 
laundering are common amongst those who have left Cuba to pursue 
professional baseball careers.11 Dangerous journeys, similar to 
                                                                                                             
 6 Id. 
 7 Scott Eden, No One Walks Off The Island, ESPN (Apr. 17, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/10781144/no-one-walks-island-los-
angeles-dodgers-yasiel-puig-journey-cuba#section-3 [hereinafter Eden]. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Steve Dilbeck, Yasiel Puig’s Incredible Journey From Cuba to U.S. Told 
by LA Magazine, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Apr. 14, 2014, 7:03 AM), 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/dodgers/dodgersnow/la-sp-dn-dodgers-yasiel-
puig-journey-20140413-story.html#ixzz2z60I2kfv [hereinafter Dilbeck]. 
 10 Eden, supra note 7. 
 11 See Murray Chass, What’s $32 Million More? Yanks Sign Contreras, NEW 
YORK TIMES (Dec. 25, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/25/sports/base-
ball-what-s-32-million-more-yanks-sign-contreras.html; Jordan Ritter Conn, 
From Cuba With Heat, GRANTLAND (July 16, 2013), http://grantland.com/fea-
tures/marlins-rookie-pitcher-jose-fernandez-journey-cuban-defector-mlb-all-
star/; Susan Slusser and Demian Bulwa, The Céspedes Saga, SAN FRANCISCO 
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Puig’s, have allowed numerous Cubans to sign large contracts with 
MLB teams, thereby incentivizing smugglers to “cash-in.”12 Smug-
glers often promise freedom in exchange for a stake in the contracts 
made by prospective Major Leaguers.13 Take Puig, for example, 
who was forced to pay several of the financiers of his escape at least 
$2 million.14 You may be wondering: Why must Cuban baseball 
players risk their lives, their well being, and large portions of their 
eventual salary to make it to the MLB? The answer to this question 
is simple—current MLB rules fueled by the United States’s Cuban 
embargo prevent MLB teams from negotiating directly with Cuban 
prospects.15 Instead, a loophole in the league’s collective bargaining 
agreement allows these players to negotiate with teams once they 
have established residency in a foreign country. Although Cubans 
may choose an alternative route—entering the Rule 4 Draft directly 
from Cuba—these players are significantly limited in terms of their 
choice of team as well as the amount of money in their eventual 
contract. However, given the dual announcement by President 
Barack Obama and Cuban leader Raúl Castro—that the two coun-
tries plan to restore diplomatic relations—the future of Cuban base-
ball players in Major League Baseball may pave the way for future 
change.16 
This note explores the past, present, and future of the path for 
Cuban baseball players into MLB. Specifically, this note will ex-
plore the late-2014 agreement between the United States and Cuba 
to normalize relations and its anticipated impact on MLB. Part I will 
                                                                                                             
GATE (July 31, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/athletics/article/The-C-
spedes-saga-4665271.php. 
 12 Katz, supra note 5. 
 13 Jeff Passan, Charles Robinson & Rand Getlin, Leonys Martin Lawsuit De-
tails Allegations of Cuban Baseball Player Smuggling, YAHOO! SPORTS (Dec. 6, 
2013, 1:17 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/news/leonys-martin-lawsuit-details-al-
legations-of-cuban-baseball-player-smuggling-061730936.html [hereinafter Pas-
san, Robinson, & Getlin]. 
 14 Eden, supra note 7. 
 15 Wendy Thurm, Trafficking in Cuban Ballplayers: A Look at Florida’s New 
Law, FANGRAPHS (June 25, 2014), http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/trafficking-
cuban-ballplayers-florida-legislature-governor/. 
 16 Linda Robertson, What Will Become of Baseball’s Decline in Cuba? The 
Field Might Open Further in U.S., MIAMI HERALD (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:56 PM), 
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/arti-
cle5078058.html. 
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explore the historical context of the relationship between the two 
countries with a focus on the effect baseball has had on the relation-
ship. Part II will draw attention to MLB’s current policies and the 
turmoil Cuban baseball players must go through to make it to the 
big leagues. Part III will concentrate on the issues that are occurring 
on a regular basis because of the circuitous emigration process for 
Cuban baseball players to make MLB. Part IV will explore the nor-
malization of diplomatic relations agreement between the United 
States and Cuba. Finally, Part V will explore a possible framework 
to enhance the safety involved with the emigration process and effi-
ciency of the troubling emigration issue while utilizing the normal-
ized relations platform to align incentives. 
I. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: IMPACT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION AND 
TRADE EMBARGO 
The current MLB system for attracting and signing players that 
hail from Cuba is deeply rooted in the social and political diplomatic 
relationship between the governments of Cuba and the United 
States.17 Prior to the Cuban Revolution of 1959, baseball served as 
a common interest that bound the two countries socially. Following 
the Revolution, however, United States policy encouraged a system 
of isolation and restriction. This section reviews the historical con-
text of the Cuba-United States relationship as it is reflected through 
the game of baseball. 
A. The Cuba-United States Baseball Relationship Prior to 
1959 
Notwithstanding the turbulent relationship between the United 
States and Cuba that exists today, baseball actually served as a com-
mon bond between the United and Cuba for almost a century pre-
ceding the Cuban Revolution of 1959.18 The creation of the game of 
                                                                                                             
 17 Matthew Frankel, Major League Problems: Baseball’s Broken System of 
Cuban Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383, 387 (2005) [hereinafter 
Frankel]. 
 18 Rachel D. Solomon, Cuban Baseball Players, the Unlucky Ones: United 
States-Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the 
United States-Cuba Relationship, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 143, 156 (2011) [herein-
after Solomon]. 
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baseball dates back to the 1840s in a neighborhood just outside of 
New York City.19 The game reached Cuba shortly thereafter.20 In 
Cuba, sailors from the United States and Cubans returning from 
American universities popularized the game and sparked interest 
throughout the country.21 Two Cuban port cities, Havana and Ma-
tanzas, quickly “became hotbeds for the new sport.”22 The two cities 
faced off against one another in the first officially recorded Cuban 
baseball game in December of 1874.23 The formation of Cuban pro-
fessional and amateur leagues quickly followed.24 
Following its popularization and rapid exposure, baseball served 
as a “cultural bridge between Cuba and the United States, with ball-
players constantly in transit from one country to the other.”25 From 
the 1870s until the Cuban Revolution of 1959, Cuban and American 
baseball players traveled freely between the two nations.26 Cuban 
stars moved to the United States to participate at “all levels of Amer-
ican professional baseball,” including MLB.27 During the winters of 
MLB’s offseason, MLB teams sent their younger players to partici-
pate in Cuba’s professional leagues as an opportunity to improve 
their skills for the upcoming MLB season.28 Some MLB teams es-
tablished spring training facilities in Cuba.29 Others traveled to Cuba 
to square off in exhibition games against some of the world’s top 
international talent. Cuba served as the “leading source of Latin-
American baseball talent.”30 From 1954 to 1960, Havana served as 
the home to a minor league baseball team, the Havana Sugar Kings, 
                                                                                                             
 19 Id. 
 20 Frankel, supra note 17, at 387; ROBERTO GONZÁLEZ ECHEVARRÍA, THE 
PRIDE OF HAVANA: A HISTORY OF CUBAN BASEBALL 90 (1999) (explaining that 
a man named Nemesio Guilló brought the first bat and ball to Cuba in 1864 after 
going to school at a college in Mobile, Alabama) [hereinafter ECHEVARRÍA]. 
 21 Frankel, supra note 17, at 387–88; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 83–90. 
 22 Frankel, supra note 17, at 387–88; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 82–83. 
 23 Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 86. 
 24 Katherine E. Baird, Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market 
Forces, 29 J. SPORT & SOC. ISSUES 164, 166 (2005) [hereinafter Baird]. 
 25 Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; Solomon, supra note 18 at 156. 
 26 Solomon, supra note 18, at 156. 
 27 Frankel, supra note 17, at 388; MILTON H. JAMAIL, FULL COUNT: INSIDE 
CUBAN BASEBALL 77 (2000). 
 28 Frankel, supra note 17, at 388–89. 
 29 Baird, supra note 24, at 166; Frankel, supra note 17, at 389. 
 30 Solomon, supra note 18, at 156. 
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which was affiliated with the Cincinnati Redlegs (known today as 
the Cincinnati Reds) and played in the Class AAA International 
League.31 The baseball relationship between Cuba and the United 
States became so strong that several prominent Cubans held prelim-
inary discussions for a MLB team to be based out of Cuba.32 
B. Baseball as a Form of Cuban National Identity 
At the time, Cuba was under Spanish rule.33 Throughout the 
1850s and 1860s, Cuban planters and other wealthy natives de-
manded social and economic change.34 In October of 1868, demands 
for independence culminated in a Cuban uprising.35 This uprising 
sparked the Guerra de los Diez Años or the Ten Years’ War, the first 
Cuban War of Independence.36 In 1869, the War prompted Spanish 
authorities to ban the game of baseball in Cuba.37 In response, Cu-
ban baseball emerged as a rejection of Spanish hegemony.38 Cuban 
baseball became symbolic of social change and independence.39 Cu-
bans used baseball to establish a national identity that was distinct 
from Spain and as a symbol of their national pride.40 Thus, since its 
popularization in the late 1800s, “baseball has been considered “part 
of the nacionalidad cubana [Cuban national identity].”41  
                                                                                                             
 31 Michael S. Schmidt, Opening of Relations Could Bring Cuban Stars to 
Major League Baseball, NEW YORK TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/12/18/sports/baseball/for-baseball-cuba-is-front-and-cen-
ter.html. 
 32 Solomon, supra note 18, at 156; see also Baird, supra note 24, at 166. 
 33 LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM AND REVOLUTION 80-89 
(Rafael Hernandez and John H. Coatsworth, eds., Oxford University Press, 3rd 
ed., 2005). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See generally ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Ibsen Martinez, Latin Baseball: A Frontier Story, LIBRARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND LIBERTY (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.econlib.org/library/Col-
umns/y2006/Martinezbaseball.html. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Frankel, supra note 17, at 388. 
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C. The Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Banning of Professional 
Baseball in Cuba 
The start of the Cuban Revolution of 1959 ended the “symbiotic 
relationship” between Cuban and American baseball.42 Guerilla 
leader Fidel Castro led the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s author-
itarian government and established Cuba as a socialist state with a 
Communist government.43 As leader, Castro employed wide-rang-
ing changes to the nation’s baseball program to emphasize the gov-
ernment’s socialist values.44 In 1961, Castro abolished professional 
baseball in favor of a strictly amateur baseball system.45 The new 
system was “centered on a socialist paradigm of amateur sports mo-
tivated by national ideals rather than money.”46 Officials of the Rev-
olution believed that the profit motive under a capitalist system cor-
rupted the sport. The Cuban government established success in base-
ball as a primary goal of the Communist government, as a means of 
legitimizing and drawing positive attention to the Cuban Revolu-
tion.47 In line with communist ideals, players in the Cuban leagues 
received a salary from the government that was “comparable to the 
earnings of the majority of the labor force.”48 
D. The Response of the United States: The Cuban Embargo 
In the wake of the Cuban Revolution and Cuba’s establishment 
of a Communist government, the United States responded by enact-
ing an embargo against Cuba and severing diplomatic ties with the 
nation. The United States government implemented the Cuban em-
bargo in 1963 based in part upon the Trading With the Enemy Act 
(“TWEA”), originally passed in 1917 during World War I.49 The 
                                                                                                             
 42 Solomon, supra note 18, at 156. 
 43 Guy Raz and Jason Beaubien, Cuba Marks 50 Years Since ‘Triumphant 
Revolution, National Public Radio (Jan. 1, 2009, 4:00PM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98937598. 
 44 ECHEVARRÍA, supra note 20, at 355; Frankel, supra note 17, at 390. 
 45 Frankel, supra note 17, at 390 
 46 Solomon, supra note 18, at 156–57. 
 47 Paula Pettavino & Philip Brenner, “The Role of Sports in Cuba’s Domestic 
and International Policy.” Cuba Briefing Paper, 21(4), 2. 
 48 Solomon, supra note 18, at 157. 
 49 Matthew Poehl, Double Play: How Major League Baseball Can Fix the 
Amateur Draft and International Player Acquisition with One Swing, 8 
WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 17 (Fall 2010). 
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TWEA bans “transfers of property between United States citizens 
and enemy nations, unless authorized by the President.”50 The Pres-
ident may exercise the powers conferred by the TWEA in times of 
war as well as in peacetime to “enable the President to engage in 
extensive regulation of international economic transactions when a 
national emergency so required.”51 Section 5(b) of the TWEA, in 
pertinent part, allows the President of the United States to: 
investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, 
void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition holding, 
withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transporta-
tion, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or 
exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect 
to, or transaction involving, any property in which 
any foreign country or a national thereof has any in-
terest by any person, or with respect to any property, 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.52 
In 1963, based on the President’s TWEA powers, the Kennedy 
Administration passed the Cuba Assets Control Regulations 
(“CACR”).53 The regulations provide the “basic governing rules for 
of the Cuban embargo.”54 The CACR prohibits “‘transactions inci-
dent to travel to, from, and within Cuba’ as well as any ‘payment or 
transfer’ to any Cuban national.”55 
The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (“CDA”)56 and the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,57 also known as the 
Helms-Burton Act, further expanded impact of the embargo and re-
strictions of the CACR. The CDA strengthened the embargo sanc-
tions to include a “ban on conducting business in Cuba to U.S.-
                                                                                                             
 50 Solomon, supra note 18, at 169. 
 51 Solomon, supra note 18, at 168 (quoting Cornet Stores v. Morton, 632 F.2d 
96, 97 (9th Cir. 1990)). 
 52 50 U.S.C.A. § 5(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
 53 Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.101–901 (2009); see 
also Solomon, supra note 18, at 169. 
 54 Frankel, supra note 17, at 393 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 6032(c)). 
 55 Frankel, supra note 17, at 393 (citing 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.305, 515.309(a), 
515.415(a)(1)). 
 56 Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 6001–6024 (2009). 
 57 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 31 C.F.R. § 515 
(1999) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act]. 
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owned or controlled business located overseas.”58 The stated pur-
pose of the CDA was to maintain the embargo and sanctions against 
Cuba “so long as the Cuban government refused to move toward 
democratization and greater respect for human rights.”59 The 
Helms-Burton Act aims to “globalize the current U.S. trade em-
bargo . . . by discouraging third-party countries and their nationals 
from dealing or investing in Cuba.”60 Similar to the CDA, the 
Helms-Burton Act places sanctions on the nation in order to encour-
age Cuba to adopt a democratically elected government and to im-
prove overall conditions in the country.61 
E. Cuban Escapees: Why Do They Leave? 
In Cuba, Castro’s Communist government “fashions national 
heroes out of its star ballplayers.”62 Despite the glorified hero status 
in their homeland, some Cuban players have sought to take their tal-
ents to the United States.63 However, some Cubans view the escap-
ees as traitors, and their escape “implies a rejection of patria, or 
homeland.”64 This decision to leave is often a difficult one, as Cuban 
players that choose to leave are “given the label traidores al béisbol, 
or ‘baseball traitors,’ by the [Cuban] government.”65 Aspiring base-
ball players “must leave [their] homeland forever . . . relinquish[ing] 
their basic human right to return home.”66 The government treats the 
players as if they “no longer exist, never mentioning them again in 
the state-controlled press.”67  In the official record books, an asterisk 
is left next to the names of these players that reads abandonó el país, 
meaning “left the country.”68 Some scholars attribute this desire to 
leave to the superior level of talent in the United States.69 Others 
                                                                                                             
 58 Solomon, supra note 18, at 170; see CDA, supra note 56 at § 6005. 
 59 Solomon, supra note 18, at 170. 
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stress that Cubans prefer to play in the MLB “mainly because of the 
large contracts.”70 Whereas baseball players in Cuba are paid small 
stipends by the government, escaping to the United States could en-
title the players to a big payday.71 The average Cuban baseball 
player makes forty-dollars per month.72 Although this is twice as 
much as the average Cuban, the average MLB salary in 2013 was 
almost $3.4 million, which equates to approximately $283,000 per 
month.73 The disparity in potential salary, coupled with the poor 
conditions in Cuba, creates a large incentive to escape, even at the 
expense of being branded disloyal to Cuba and being put through 
dangerous and traumatic experiences. 
F. Cuba-United States Baseball Relationship Today 
The Cuban trade embargo and the resulting economic and polit-
ical sanctions have had a significant impact on Cuban baseball play-
ers who seek to play professionally in the United States. The em-
bargo effectively “prohibit[s] MLB organizations from conducting 
any business in Cuba, such as scouting or signing players.”74 Be-
cause a Cuban national may not enter the MLB directly, players 
seeking to play in the MLB must escape from Cuba and renounce 
their Cuban citizenship.75 This requirement leaves one of two routes 
to professional baseball in the United States: (1) attempt to enter the 
United States by seeking asylum or (2) escape to another country.76 
Following the Cuban Revolution, it took nearly thirty-years for 
a player to challenge Cuba’s new, amateur-only system.77 On July 
10, 1991, while visiting the United States as a member of the Cuban 
National baseball team, a pitcher named Rene Arocha “found an exit 
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sign” at Miami International Airport and became the first Cuban to 
leave the country in order to play professionally in the United 
States.78 By leaving, Arocha “single-handedly ended Castro’s mo-
nopoly on Cuban baseball talent and catalyzed a revolution on both 
sides of the Straits of Florida.”79 Since his escape, nearly 160 players 
have followed Arocha’s lead.80 As of the end of the 2014 season, 
there were twenty-four Cubans on MLB rosters.81 
In 1999, in conjunction with then-President Bill Clinton’s efforts 
to ease the Cuban trade embargo and improve relations with the is-
land nation, the Baltimore Orioles participated in a “home and 
home” series against the Cuban National Baseball team—the Ori-
oles traveled to Cuba for several games in March, and the Cuban 
National Team returned the favor by playing the Orioles in Balti-
more that May.82 The organization of the series required the State 
Department to negotiate terms with the Castro government—profits 
from the game in Baltimore could not be sent to the Cuban govern-
ment due to the embargo.83 Despite accusations that the game was 
being used as an avenue to illegally scout Cuban players, the series 
was a significant step in the right direction toward improving the 
baseball relationship between Cuba and the United States.84 
On the eve of the March 1999 game in Havana, Fidel Castro 
hosted several of Major League Baseball’s senior executives, in-
cluding baseball’s commissioner Bud Selig, for dinner at his Presi-
dential palace.85 As the dinner crept into the early hours of the morn-
ing, Castro “regaled Selig with tales of Cuban baseball and fanta-
sized about what would happen if the United States and Cuba nor-
malized diplomatic and economic ties.”86 Throughout the discus-
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sion, Castro announced that his nation was “open to the idea of ma-
jor league teams having academies in Cuba.”87 Despite progress in 
these talks of having an active baseball relationship with Cuba, the 
discussions served as nothing but a distant dream.88 
In recent years, numerous Cubans, including Puig, have become 
stars in the MLB after signing lucrative contracts with MLB fran-
chises.89 Puig himself signed a seven-year, $42 million deal and was 
an all-star in 2014.90 In the summer of 2013, first baseman Jose 
Abreu left Cuba and signed a six-year deal worth $68 million.91 In 
his first season, Abreu was an all-star and won the American League 
Rookie of the Year and Silver Slugger awards.92 Aroldis Chapman, 
who escaped in 2009, has represented the National League in three 
straight all-star games and is viewed as one of the best relief pitchers 
in the game today.93 
Some commentators argue that the market for Cuban baseball 
players has gotten out-of-hand, based on the potential to strike gold 
like the Dodgers with Puig or the White Sox with Abreu.94 In August 
2014, the Boston Red Sox signed outfielder Rusney Castillo to a 
seven-year, $72.5 million contract, the richest deal ever for a Cu-
ban.95 Castillo had not played competitively in over a year.96 Despite 
his enormous potential, scouts questioned his defensive skills and 
whether his “long swing” would translate into success against 
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harder-throwing major league pitchers.97 Similarly, in November 
2014, the Arizona Diamondbacks signed 24-year-old outfielder 
Yasmany Tomas to a six-year pledge worth $68.5 million, despite 
concerns over his ability to stay in shape and remain in the outfield 
at the major league level.98 Tomas was coming off of a down year 
in which he was injured.99 
In addition to the success and large contracts, each of these play-
ers share another common storyline with Puig: their treacherous 
path to the United States. Hidden behind the million-dollar curtains 
and awards are their dangerous tales of human trafficking. Like 
Puig’s story, other stories of smuggling, guns, bribes, and danger 
have been slowly unveiled. These dangers can be attributed to cur-
rent MLB policies that bar teams from speaking to, negotiating with, 
and having any affiliation with Cuba and their nationals. 
G. Cuba’s Loan System: the First Step Toward an Open 
Market? 
After years of public denouncement towards players who escape 
the country to pursue professional baseball opportunities overseas, 
the Cuba Serie Nacional instituted an overhauled domestic league 
system in September 2013.100 Although Cubans, ranging from Cas-
tro to representatives of the Cuban Serie Nacional, maintained a 
harsh stance against Cuban players that leave the island, the league 
created a process that allows Cuban players to travel to a overseas 
professional leagues in Mexico and Japan.101 Some baseball schol-
ars predicted this new system would provide the first step towards 
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an open Cuban baseball market.102 The reality of this new system, 
however, is that the change in policy reflects little more than a fi-
nancial opportunity for the Cuban league and Cuban teams to revive 
their dilapidated stadiums and outdated equipment.103 Further, a 
scandal during the system’s first year further complicated the al-
ready controversial human trafficking concerns involved with leav-
ing the island.104 
Cuba’s new system allowing for players to pursue overseas op-
portunities hinges on two distinct contingencies: players may per-
form overseas so long as (1) the player is to “remain property of the 
government-controlled baseball enterprise,” and (2) the player may 
play only during the Cuban offseason in the summer months and 
must return to their respective Cuban team once the Cuban season 
begins in the winter.105 Essentially, the Cuban league agrees to a 
loan agreement with the Mexican League and the Nippon Profes-
sional Baseball League in Japan.106 Because the Cuban Government 
operates the Serie Nacional, anywhere from as low as 10% to as high 
as 75% of the player’s overseas salary is paid directly to the Cuban 
sports arm of the Cuban government.107 Players do not negotiate 
their own overseas deals—league officials do.108 Additionally, play-
ers must be available at all times to participate in tournaments with 
the national team.109 Although the new system does allow for play-
ers to travel, the heavy restrictions focus on keeping the players in 
Cuba for the long run.110 For some, it is seen as a “perk for long-
term loyalty,” rather than a shift towards encouraging players to 
seek overseas contracts.111 Due to the lack of freedom, players are 
                                                                                                             
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Enrique Rojas, OF in Mexico With False Passport, ESPN DEPORTES (May 
15, 2014, 8:23 AM), http://espn.go.com/mlb/story/_/id/10927805/top-cuban-al-
fredo-despaigne-mexico-false-passport [hereinafter Rojas]. 
 105 Bjarkman, supra note 100. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Compare id. with Jorge L. Ortiz, Can Agreement with USA Fix Defects in 
Cuban Baseball?, USA TODAY SPORTS (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:15 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/02/04/cuba-mlb-defections-car-
ibbean-series/22897737/ [hereinafter Ortiz]. 
 108 Ortiz, supra note 107. 
 109 Bjarkman, supra note 100. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
SUMMER 2016]     NORMALIZED RELATIONS AND MLB INFLUENCE 275 
 
simply political chess pieces in the government-controlled baseball 
enterprise. The players serve as little more than a way for the Cuban 
sports federation to increase its revenue. The new system signals lit-
tle, if any, change in the Cuban stance towards players leaving the 
country. 
Additionally, the new Cuban system has become riddled with 
problems and controversy in its short lifetime.112 Alfredo Des-
paigne, a three-time MVP in Serie Nacional and one of the Cuban 
League’s biggest stars, became the first player to “sign” with an 
overseas team when he was assigned to the Mexican League Cam-
peche club.113 Despaigne, along with several other Cubans, partici-
pated in the Mexican League during the 2013 season and returned 
to the island with relatively few problems.114 However, before the 
start of the 2014 Mexican League season, Major League Baseball 
(with whom the Mexican League has a professional affiliation) ad-
vised Mexican League officials that the league must require a pass-
port from a third country before employing Cuban players, due to 
concerns involving the United States’s embargo against Cuba.115 In 
May of 2014, after the Mexican League’s season was underway, 
ESPN Deportes reporter Enrique Rojas revealed that Despaigne was 
playing in the Mexican League using a falsified passport from the 
Dominican Republic.116 Despaigne had no family in the Domincan 
Republic.117 He had never visited the island.118 Shortly thereafter, 
the Mexican League served Despaigne a lifetime ban and he re-
turned to Cuba.119 After the controversy surrounding Despaigne, the 
Cuban League shifted its focus to loaning players to the Nippon Pro-
fessional Baseball League in Japan.120 Although the stints in Japan 
                                                                                                             
 112 See Rojas, supra note 104. 
 113 Ben Badler, Why is Cuban Outfielder Alfredo Despaigne Playing in Mex-
ico Using a Dominican Passport?, BASEBALL AMERICA (May 13, 2014), 
http://www.baseballamerica.com/international/why-is-cuban-outfielder-alfredo-
despaigne-playing-in-mexico-using-a-dominican-passport/. 
 114 Rojas, supra note 104. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Bjarkman, supra note 100. 
 120 Id. 
276 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:2 
 
have been successful thus far, the Cuban sports federation has cho-
sen a mere four players, veterans Despaigne, Freddie Cepeda, Yulie-
ski Gourriel, and highly-touted prospect Héctor Mendoza, to play in 
Japan.121 Despite the potential for additional transfers, given the rich 
talent on the island, the choice of players appears to be a strategic 
one that balances the likelihood of the player remaining in Cuba and 
the potential size of the contract the player will receive. Still, how-
ever, Cuba remains far from willing to open its doors completely, 
especially to the United States. 
II. CURRENT MLB POLICY: THE PATH TO THE SHOW 
MLB subjects Cuban players to a unique system of rules when 
compared to players from other foreign countries.122 Current rules 
force Cubans to escape the island to play professionally in the 
United States.123 Thus, Cubans have three options: (1) regardless of 
age and accrued playing time, obtain political asylum by escaping 
to the United States, Canada, or Puerto Rico, subjecting the player 
to the Rule 4 amateur draft; (2) prior to the age of twenty three or 
before playing five professional seasons in Cuba, escape to another 
country, subjecting the player to international amateur free agency 
rules/limitations; or (3) after turning twenty three and accruing five 
years of professional baseball in Cuba, escape to another country, 
subjecting the player to regular free agency rules. The timing and 
destination of their escape have a significant impact on their free 
agency in terms of their total contract as well as their freedom to 
sign with a team of their choice.124 
A. The Kuhn Directive 
In 1977, then-MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn inaugurated the 
“Kuhn Directive,” Major League Baseball’s rules concerning Cuban 
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players.125 The rules prohibit the “discussion or negotiation with an-
yone in Cuba regarding the signing of any player in Cuba.”126 Ad-
ditionally, this forbids any MLB or team representative from scout-
ing Cuban players, so long as the player remains on the island.127 
However, the directive does not expressly prohibit scouting players 
when they are not on the island.128 Because MLB teams may not 
sign players that are residents of Cuba (a restriction that is unique 
amongst other nations), teams must wait for the players to leave the 
country.129 Consequently, in the event that players seek to join a 
MLB team, they must escape and establish residency in either the 
United States or another foreign country.130 
In time, however, players began to find creative ways to enter 
the MLB, which turned out to be a much more lucrative career, but 
also riskier. Cubans seeking to play in the MLB first established res-
idency in a third country and then entered the United States on an 
“O” or “P” visa.131 
By doing so, the players avoid the draft provisions of Rule 4 and 
are free to negotiate salaries with all MLB teams instead of having 
to wait a year to establish residency and enter the Draft.132 In other 
words, the Cuban player must abide by the Cuban Adjustment Act 
(“wet foot, dry foot” American policy), which generally allows Cu-
ban nationals to stay in America if they are caught on American soil 
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(dry foot) but face possible repatriation to Cuba if they are caught at 
sea (wet foot).133 In many cases, players prefer to seek asylum in the 
United States in compliance with the “wet-foot, dry-foot” rule after 
moving to another country like Mexico or Haiti first, which are safer 
to get to from Cuba.134 
B. Major League Baseball Eligibility Requirements 
Rule 3 of the Major League Baseball Rules describe the eligibil-
ity requirements for MLB teams to acquire players. Rule 
3(a)(1)(A)–(B), in pertinent part, provides the following: 
(a) ELIGIBILITY TO SIGN MAJOR LEAGUE OR 
MINOR LEAGUE CONTRACTS 
(1) General Rules . . . A Major or Minor League Club 
may contract with a player under the conditions and 
restrictions set forth in this Rule 3. A player may be 
subject to one or more of the following Rules and 
may contract with a Major a Major or Minor League 
Club only if the conditions and restrictions of all 
Rules applicable to the player are satisfied. It is the 
responsibility of the contracting Club to determine 
that a player is eligible to sign in accordance with this 
Rule 3. For purposes of this Rule 3, the term “United 
States” shall mean the 50 States of the United States 
of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and any other Commonwealth, Territory or Posses-
sion of the United States of America. 
(A) A player who has not previously contracted 
with a Major or Minor League Club, and who is 
a resident of the United States or Canada, may be 
signed to a contract only after having been eligi-
ble for selection in the First- Year Player draft. A 
player shall be considered a “resident of the 
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United States” if the player enrolls in a United 
States high school or college or establishes a le-
gal residence in the United States on the date of 
the player’s contract or within one year prior to 
that date . . . . 
(B) A player who has not previously contracted 
with a Major or Minor League Club, who is not a 
resident of the United States or Canada, and who 
is not subject to the High School, College or Jun-
ior College Rules, may be signed to a contract if 
the player: 
(i) is at least 17 years old at the time of signing, 
or 
(ii) is 16 at the time of signing, but will attain age 
17 prior to either the end of the effective season 
for which the player has signed or September 1 
of such effective season, whichever is later.135 
Although seemingly a Cuban national qualifies as an interna-
tional player under Rule 3(a)(1)(B) (a player from Cuba is “not a 
resident of the United States or Canada”), the Kuhn Directive pro-
hibits such a determination.136 Instead, to be eligible to play in the 
MLB, the Cuban player must escape Cuba to sign a contract with a 
Major League organization.137 To fall under Category A, the Cuban 
player must immigrate to the United States, Puerto Rico, or Canada 
and establish legal residency.138 Alternatively, to fall under Cate-
gory B as an international player, the Cuban must establish resi-
dency in another country that is not Cuba.139 The decision to seek 
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qualification under Category A or Category B has a significant im-
pact on the player’s future career, both in terms of money as well as 
choice of team.140 
C. Routes to the MLB 
1. Rule 4 First-Year Player Draft 
Players who fall under Category A (meaning they are legal res-
idents of the United States, a United States territory, or Canada and 
have completed either high school, two years of Junior College, or 
at least three years at a standard college) are required to enter the 
First-Year Player Draft (“Rule 4 Draft”).141 Rule 4 of the Major 
League Baseball Rules governs the First-Year Player Draft.142 Rule 
4(b) dictates that in June of each year, MLB shall a selection meet-
ing for Category A players.143 The Rule 4 draft consists of fifty se-
lection rounds, where each team generally has the right to select one 
player per round.144 The draft order is determined by the previous 
season’s standings, with the first pick awarded to the team with the 
worst record.145 Additionally, teams that lost free agents in the pre-
vious season may be awarded “compensatory” selections.146 
Selection of a player essentially provides a team with exclusive 
contract negotiation rights with that individual player until July 15 
of the draft year.147 Rule 3(c), in conjunction with Article VI of the 
MLB Player’s Association Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(“CBA”), dictates the base terms of first-year player contracts.148 In 
other words, the MLB rules dictate the salaries for contracts signed 
by players that have been drafted.149 
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However, MLB teams do have some discretion as to the signing 
bonus of the contract, terms that are separate from the salary itself.150 
The complicated signing bonus rules are laid out in the CBA.151 
Prior to the draft, the Commissioner’s Office allocates a “bonus 
pool,” the total amount of money from which a team may draw and 
offer to its drafted players for their initial contracts.152 The bonus 
pool is based on the sum of the “slot-value” of a team’s first ten 
picks, a recommended total for each draft pick’s signing bonus ac-
cording to their draft position.153 Beyond the first ten rounds, any 
signing bonus amount that surpasses $100,000 is subtracted from 
the team’s bonus pool.154 Although there is not a hard cap on the 
team’s bonus pool, teams face harsh tax penalties for spending an 
amount greater than their bonus pool.155 Accordingly, each team has 
the discretion to award signing bonuses that are greater than the in-
dividual slot value, as long as the team compensates for this amount 
with the signing bonuses of its other draft picks.156 
For aspiring Cubans, taking the Rule 4 Draft route by entering 
the United States, a United States Territory, or Canada seems to be 
the least attractive option. First, because they are forced to enter the 
MLB draft, the Cuban player does not have the option of choosing 
which team they would prefer to play for. Because the draft has a 
specific selection order, each of the thirty MLB teams has the op-
portunity to draft the player. Second, because the MLB has such 
strict rules for signing bonuses, a Cuban player’s total contract is 
severely limited. While the higher draft picks tend to receive higher 
bonuses, the amount of the signing bonus is still a fraction of what 
the player might otherwise earn on the open free agency market. 
Additionally, players do not know what number selection they will 
be in the draft, much less whether or not they will be drafted at all. 
If a Cuban player enters the annual draft and each team fails to draft 
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the player, the player is unable to attain free agency.157 With the least 
amount of freedom, entering the Rule 4 Draft is the least beneficial 
option for Cuban baseball players. 
2. International Amateur Free Agency and Bonus Pools 
International players that fall under Category B (meaning they 
are over the age of seventeen and are not residents of the United 
States, a United States territory, or Canada) are subject to Interna-
tional Amateur Free Agency rules dictated by the current CBA.158 
The international signing period extends from July 2 through June 
15 of the following season.159 Similar to the Rule 4 Draft, the MLB 
Commissioners’ Office assigns a bonus pool to each team, the total 
amount a team may spend on its international free agents.160 The 
team with the worst winning percentage from the previous season 
receives the largest pool.161 The bonus pool applies to all interna-
tional free agent bonuses that are distributed in excess of $10,000.162 
Also similar to the Rule 4 draft, the penalties for teams exceeding 
their international bonus spending caps are extremely harsh.163 
There is no selection order for international free agency and teams 
are free to negotiate with individual players at their leisure.164 
 Leaving Cuba and immigrating to a country outside of the 
United States, a United States territory, or Canada, and then taking 
the International Amateur Free Agency route, is seemingly a more 
attractive option for aspiring Cuban players. The important differ-
ence between international free agency and the Rule 4 Draft for Cu-
bans is the ability to negotiate and choose teams freely.165 This al-
lows Cuban players to create their own market (in terms of their 
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signing bonus total) as well as choose which organization will best 
suit their transition to the United States (in terms of the location of 
the team).166 By placing teams in a bidding war for their services, 
Cubans are able to take a market-based approach that best suits their 
needs.167 However, like the Rule 4 Draft, the bonus pool limits each 
player’s signing bonus amount.168 Even if teams were to allocate 
their entire bonus pool to a single player, a star Cuban player is 
likely to earn significantly more money in a completely open mar-
ket.169 Nevertheless, when left with the choice of international free 
agency or entering the Rule 4 Draft, it is virtually a no-brainer for 
Cuban players to choose free agency, given the freedom to choose 
one’s MLB organization.170 
3. Exception to International Free Agency 
Although most Cubans who leave to a country outside of the 
United States, a United States territory, and Canada are subject to 
the bonus pool limitations, an important exemption from the rule 
exists for certain players.171 The bonus pools do not limit contracts 
signed by Cubans that are (1) at least 23 years old, (2) have played 
in a Cuban professional league for a least five seasons, and (3) have 
left the island.172 Instead, Cubans seeking to play in the MLB that 
meet this exception have unlimited negotiating power when it comes 
to their total contracts and signing bonuses.173 These players are 
treated equally with other free agents that have earned service time 
playing in the MLB—they are free to choose any of the 30 MLB 
organizations and the only limits on the contract totals for these 
players are their respective owner’s pockets.174 The large contracts 
that have made recent headlines, like those of Puig, Abreu, and 
Chapman, each fit under this exception.175 With neither a restriction 
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on team nor on salary, this is the most lucrative and popular option 
for Cuban players.176 
D. An Additional Hurdle: United States Treasury Office of 
Foreign Assets Control 
United States regulations require that Cubans seeking employ-
ment in the United States obtain authorization from the United 
States Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.177 Thus, Cuban 
baseball players must obtain an “unblocked national” designation 
from OFAC in order to sign with MLB teams.178 To designate an 
individual as an unblocked national, the OFAC authorizes two types 
of licenses—specific and general.179 A specific license is a formal 
written document issued by OFAC.180 It requires that the applicant 
submit a formal application including the documents indicating per-
manent residency described above.181 A general license, however, is 
less formal— it is not a written document and does not require the 
player to submit documents to OFAC.182 Instead, a player may sub-
mit such documents directly to his prospective employer.183 
To receive the unblocked national designation from the OFAC, 
a Cuban national has two options.184 For players that escape to the 
United States, the Cuban player must take up residence in the United 
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States and, at a minimum, submit an application to become a per-
manent resident.185 For Cuban players that escape to another foreign 
country, the player must present at least two documents indicating 
permanent residency from the foreign government to their prospec-
tive employer or to the Office through a formal application.186 Such 
documents may include a “passport, voter registration card, perma-
nent resident card, or national identity card.”187 
Prior to 2012, MLB allowed teams to sign players from Cuba as 
long as the player received either a general or specific license.188 
Thus, players like Yasiel Puig were able to obtain the unblocked 
national designation simply by presenting the required foreign gov-
ernment documents to the team seeking their services.189 This did 
not require a formal, specific license, and players did not have to 
submit documents directly to the OFAC.190 However, towards the 
end of 2012, MLB sent a memo to all thirty teams detailing new, 
stiffer requirements regarding the unblocked national designa-
tion.191 Today, teams may not sign a Cuban national until the OFAC 
has issued a specific license to the player.192 This does not appear to 
coincide with any change in US policy regarding the Cuban trade 
embargo or immigration laws.193 Additionally, MLB has refused to 
comment regarding these stiffer requirements on numerous occa-
sions.194 
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III: LITIGATION INVOLVED BASEBALL PLAYERS’, AGENTS’, 
SMUGGLERS’ IN TROUBLE 
On the other end of the spectrum, the people who aid in the 
movement of Cuban baseball players are also causing lawsuits. Of-
ten, sports agents are known for an aggressive style of seeking out 
talent and clients by any means necessary. So when a gold mine like 
Cuba produces some of the top MLB talent in recent years, it is no 
wonder that these sports agents are flocking to this market with 
goals of cashing out on a few solid deals. Since the negotiations are 
made more difficult due to Cuba’s embargo, this begs the question 
of whether these sports agents are truly looking out for their client’s 
safety, or whether they are just trying to be the first agent to make 
contact with the players and earn a cut of these players’ huge con-
tracts. Also, with regards to the human trafficking ring, sports agents 
may have been unethical when they were scouting the Mexican 
baseball academy, which was full of corrupt ordeals. 
The most notorious example of this occurrence came in 2007 
when Gus Dominguez, a sports agent, was found guilty of illegally 
assisting five baseball players across the border of the United States 
and was sentenced to five years in prison.195 South Florida attorney 
Ben Daniel has handled dozens of smuggling cases which involve 
extorting Cubans.196 Dominguez was charged with paying four aides 
to transport the athletes and other Cubans to the United States from 
Cuba.197 Attorney Daniel won the case in 2007 against Dominguez, 
which led to a five-year jail sentence for Dominguez and a ban from 
sports agency.198 With the normalized relations and the potential for 
agents to travel on licensed terms to Cuba, many sports agents are 
likely to flock into the country. 
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On May 4, 2011, Cuban outfielder Leonys Martin signed a five-
year major league contract with the Texas Rangers worth $15.5 mil-
lion dollars, including a $5 million signing bonus.199 In reality, how-
ever, Martin would never see a large percent of his signing bonus 
and salary.200 Whereas a typical MLB player can expect to lose out 
on anywhere from three to five percent of their total earnings (fees 
typically provided to their agents), Martin was to lose thirty-five 
percent of his contract.201 However, the benefactor of this thirty-five 
percent was not Martin’s agent—it was Eliezer Lazo, the man who 
helped smuggle Martin out of Cuba.202 
Details of Martin’s escape came to light in the form of a civil 
lawsuit filed against him by the Estrellas del Beisbol baseball acad-
emy.203 The suit was a breach of contract claim, alleging that Martin 
had agreed and failed to pay thirty-five percent of his MLB salary 
to the academy’s operators, one of which was Lazo.204 In a counter-
suit, Martin alleged that the Estrellas academy was a “non-exist-
ent . . . entity that serves as a front for illegal activity, such as human 
smuggling and trafficking, kidnapping and extortion.”205 
According to the countersuit, Martin decided to leave with sev-
eral family members around August 2010 through a connection in 
Miami.206 When Martin was unable to find the boat scheduled to 
pick up the group, Lazo’s cousin, Jesus Toledo, approached him.207 
Toledo promised he could sneak Martin and his group into Mex-
ico.208 Upon boarding a 45-foot yacht headed to Cancun, Lazo was 
waiting to introduce himself.209 Lazo demanded $2.5 million from 
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Martin’s Miami connection.210 Soon thereafter, Martin and three 
other baseball players were sent to a training facility in Monter-
rey.211 It was at the facility that Martin allegedly signed an agree-
ment with Martin, where the academy agreed to provide “training, 
housing and sports clothing . . . [i]n exchange . . . [for] 35 percent of 
any future professional baseball contract.”212 Although they were 
apparently there to “train,” the facility had neither baseball equip-
ment nor a baseball field.213 Martin was consistently under armed 
watch. At times, the group was forced to leave the facility due to 
fear of kidnapping by other smugglers.214 Another associate, Bart 
Hernandez, took Martin to Guatemala to acquire a passport for Mar-
tin.215 It was only after the passport was acquired that Martin’s cap-
tors allowed him to leave Mexico.216 Once his contract was signed, 
Lazo assisted Martin in moving across the border and flew him from 
Laredo, Texas to Miami.217 Shortly after their arrival, Martin was 
taken to a Merrill Lynch advisor, where Martin alleged he was co-
erced into signing a document written in English (a language he 
could not read or understand) authorizing a transfer of $1.35 million. 
The countersuit sought to retrieve the allegedly unauthorized trans-
fer.218 
Joe Kehoskie, an ex-agent who now works as a consultant for 
Cuban players, explains that human trafficking for baseball players 
has developed into a standard business procedure.219 He explains: 
You would think it’s something [smugglers would] 
be embarrassed to say or be clandestine about it. But 
they say they control or own this guy – they use a 
bunch of different euphemisms – and they want a 
ransom. They came up with an asking price. It was 
almost like going on eBay or Amazon.com. It was a 
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buy-it-now price, and you’re buying human be-
ings.220 
The details of the civil suit provided the federal government with 
enough evidence to indict Lazo in December 2013.221 Lazo was 
charged with conspiring to smuggle, kidnap, and extort Cuban base-
ball players.222 Prosecutors say that Lazo was the mastermind of a 
human-trafficking ring that smuggled Cubans into Mexico, where 
they were held captive until the Cubans or their family members 
made ransom payments.223 Lazo pled guilty to heading the smug-
gling venture and was sentenced to over fourteen years in federal 
prison.224 
In 2012, Gilberto Suarez, a South Florida businessman visiting 
Mexico City, entered a taxi and instructed the driver to take him 
from Mexico City to the Texas border.225 The steep $1,500 fare was 
miniscule in comparison to the value of the “cargo” that joined Sua-
rez—Yasiel Puig226 and three other Cuban baseball players.227 Sua-
rez explained that threats from a dangerous cartel and possibly by 
corrupt Mexican police threatened the players’ safety.228 While de-
tails after the drop off are unclear, court documents show that Puig 
and the other men were allowed to enter the United States under the 
“wet foot, dry foot” policy.229 From there, Puig was able to sign to 
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sign his seven-year, $42 million pledge to the Los Angeles Dodg-
ers.230 In exchange for his services, Suarez received $2.5 million. 
By 2014, Puig was in the midst of his second highly successful 
seasons with the Dodgers when the federal government indicted Gil-
berto Suarez.231 Suarez was charged with inducing a person to enter 
the United States without proper identification.232 By December 
2014, Suarez agreed to a plea deal.233 He was officially sentenced 
on March 6, 2015 in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida.234 The Honorable Robert Scola sentenced 
him to less than the one-year maximum penalty, sentencing Suarez 
to thirty days in prison and five months of house arrest.235 
At the sentencing hearing, Suarez explained that his intentions 
were only to assist Puig in signing a contract with the Los Angeles 
Dodgers, though the threats that he faced forced him to take the 
criminal action.236 He also argued that he had nothing to do with 
Puig’s smuggling out of Cuba.237 Nonetheless, Suarez pled guilty to 
inducement. Given the leniency of his sentence, Judge Scola ex-
plained, “I think the safety of the player and the other [players] was 
also paramount in his mind,” referring to the threats that faced Puig 
and the other players.238 
These two recent cases have revealed what appears to be a ram-
pant culture of the illegal smuggling of Cuban baseball players. 
What was once kept hidden from the public eye has now come to 
light, given the public disclosure of such facts with these lawsuits. 
At this point, it is clear that Major League Baseball is turning a blind 
eye to these illegal trafficking rings. It is time that the owners, league 
executives, and the MLB Player’s Association take steps towards 
discouraging and dissuading smugglers from continuing to their lu-
crative operations. The United States courts can only do so much. 
Given the improvement of diplomatic relations with the island, the 
government has taken the correct step towards ending the U.S.-Cuba 
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Trade Embargo. While the end is currently a long ways away, it is 
hopeful that MLB will respond in such a way as to prepare them-
selves for when this day finally comes. 
The Cuban government has also made the process of entering 
the MLB a very difficult one. In fact, the penalty is usually either 
imprisonment in Cuba or suspension from the Cuban national base-
ball team.239 In recent years, the story of Aroldis Chapman has been 
a prominent one. Chapman is a fast-throwing Cuban pitcher who 
successfully moved to the United States and is currently in the Major 
Leagues.240 Chapman allegedly became a government informant, 
which led to the false imprisonment of a fellow Cuban citizen.241 In 
a lawsuit filed by the falsely imprisoned citizen, Danilo Curbelo 
Garcia contends that Chapman made a deal with Cuban officials in 
2008 after a failed escape attempt, for which he was suspended from 
the national team.242 By becoming a productive government inform-
ant, Chapman could prove his loyalty, earn his way back into the 
good graces of the regime, and eventually return to the squad’s A-
list travel roster.243 With the government thus off his back, he could 
then plan his escape, which he did.244 Roberto Hernandez Del Llano 
explains that “most members of the national baseball team that 
travel abroad are informants for the government”.245 
There is also pending litigation with Puig in the case of Miguel 
Angel Corbacho Daudinot vs. Yasiel Puig Valdes and Maritza Val-
des Gonzalez.246 Attorney, Avelino Gonzalez represents the plaintiff 
in this case where popular sports agent Jaime Torres, who is known 
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as the Scott Boras of Cuban baseball players, represented Puig.247 
The lawsuit is a $12 million suit under the Torture Victims Protec-
tion Act of 1991248 for prolonged arbitrary detention and torture. 
Daudinot claims that Puig had concocted a tale that he was involved 
in human trafficking, resulting in his arrest, torture, and seven-year 
prison sentence.249 Similar to Chapman’s story, Puig had already at-
tempted to leave and was in trouble with the Cuban authorities. 
Daudinot claims that Puig then began making up false tales about 
others in order to make his way back on the national team.250 Ac-
cording to a Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement agency investigation, the Cuban government 
has pending litigation against anyone they catch seeking to leave the 
island or help other people leave, so Cuban players do not talk about 
leaving the island because they do not want to get themselves or 
their family and friends in trouble.251 However, Puig, similar to 
Chapman, was also still trying to secretly escape the country for the 
MLB.252 Yunior Despaigne is a key witness in the case because he 
is the link between Puig and Raul Pacheco (the man who arranged 
the escape by offering $250,000 to Puig in exchange for 20% of the 
contract).253 The dangers of the escape are evident in the fact that 
Despaigne and Puig both face threats from the men involved in the 
smuggling and Yandrys Leon, who was allegedly the ringleader of 
the escape, has been found dead in Mexico after being killed by a 
gunman.254 On December 16, 2014, Gilberto Suarez was found 
guilty for arranging and financing Puig’s escape, where he then 
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hoped to capitalize on the large salary Puig negotiated with the Los 
Angeles Dodgers in the MLB.255 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
A. Federal and State Legislation 
Even before President Obama’s announcement regarding the 
normalization of diplomatic relations with Cuba, several pieces of 
federal and state legislation have attempted to shape MLB policy in 
regards to Cuban players. The “Baseball Diplomacy Act” (“BDA”), 
a bill that has yet to find its way off of the House floor, and HB 
7095, a bill approved in the state of Florida, are two examples. 
1. The Baseball Diplomacy Act 
In September of 1995, prior to the enactment of the Helms-Bur-
ton Act, United States Representative José Serrano first introduced 
House Bill 2311, “A Bill to Waive Certain Prohibitions With Re-
spect to Nationals of Cuba Coming to the United States to Play Or-
ganized Baseball.”256 The purpose of the proposed bill is to provide 
special exceptions for Cuban nationals seeking to play baseball in 
the United States.257 Specifically, in its most current proposed form 
for the 113th Congress, the bill proposes “to waive certain foreign 
assistance and trade and travel prohibitions under federal law re-
garding Cuban nationals who: (1) enter the Untied States on a visa 
to play organized professional baseball, and (2) return to Cuba with 
their baseball earnings.” 258 The bill also seeks to provide travel vi-
sas for players that span the duration of the baseball season and need 
not be renewed (as long as the player’s contract does not change).259 
Representative Serrano has attempted to propose the bill to each of 
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the past ten Congresses.260 However, the proposed bill has yet to 
move past the subcommittee stage.261 
Although the repetitive efforts of Representative Serrano, the 
United State’s current growing relationship with Cuba may allow 
portions of the Baseball Diplomacy Act to come to fruition.262 First, 
the travel restrictions that were barred by the embargo will soon be 
lifted by the Obama administration, proved the trip is “intended to 
serve religious, educational or other approved purposes.”263 Addi-
tionally, it appears that the restrictions on the amount of money Cu-
ban relatives may send back to their home nation may soon be lifted 
as well.264 These new regulations will allow for several of the pro-
visions of the Baseball Diplomacy Act to become a reality.265 
2. HB 7095 
Florida state bill HB 7095 provides local governments with ac-
cess to as much as $13 million annually in funding for the construc-
tion or renovation of professional sports facilities.266 Local govern-
ments own the vast majority of stadiums throughout the state of 
Florida, including both Marlins Park and Tropicana Field (homes of 
the Miami Marlins and Tampa Rays).267 In addition, this law applies 
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to major league baseball teams with spring training facilities in Flor-
ida (including the Tigers, Blue Jays, Rays, Pirates, Mets, Orioles, 
Astros, Phillies and Twins) as well as fourteen minor league teams 
in Florida that play in parks owned by or on land owned by local 
governments.268 However, there is a significant “catch”—the money 
is not available unless MLB and MLB franchises violate Major 
League Baseball rules.269 To access the funds, teams must ignore 
Major League Baseball’s “third-country requirement” and instead 
negotiate with Cuban baseball players as they would with players 
from any other foreign country.270 Thus, to receive the funding 
promised by the bill, teams must either knowingly violate MLB’s 
Kuhn Directive or MLB must change its policy.271 Teams must also 
report any evidence of human trafficking.272 
Sponsors of the bill, State Representatives Jose Felix Diaz and 
Matt Gaetz, note that the purpose of the bill is to challenge current 
MLB policy regarding Cuban players.273 The law, sparked by the 
unveiling of Yasiel Puig’s dangerous escape from Cuba, is a “clear 
and strong call for MLB to repeal an outmoded policy.”274 Repre-
sentative Diaz argues that MLB policy “benefits human traffickers 
more than it does baseball . . . .Because they have limited avenues 
of escape, it’s Cuban ballplayers seeking the American Dream who 
are being thrown into the arms of human smugglers and drug traf-
fickers.”275 In response, MLB released the following statement: 
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While the sponsors of the bill in Florida blame MLB 
policies for the role of human smugglers, they do not 
provide any support for their premise that Cuban 
players must rely on traffickers to [escape] to coun-
tries other than the U.S. such as Mexico or the Do-
minican Republic, but would not need the assistance 
of traffickers to reach U.S. soil . . . .However, [the 
MLB Commissioner’s Office] will meet with the 
[Major League Baseball Player’s Association] to de-
termine whether changes can be made to [MLB’s] in-
ternational signing rules to reduce or eliminate the 
reliance of Cuban players on criminal organizations 
when leaving Cuba . . . .We also intend to speak to 
the U.S. State Department about actions that the U.S. 
government can take to reduce or eliminate the traf-
ficking of Cuban baseball players. We hope that the 
legislators in Florida will do the same.276 
Although the bill may be a step in the right direction, it is un-
likely that such state legislation will provoke widespread change in 
MLB policy. Major League Baseball’s current policies are rooted in 
the United States trade embargo with Cuba. The embargo stems 
from multiple pieces of federal legislation. Therefore, it is unlikely 
that MLB will be inclined to change its policies towards Cubans un-
less there is change involving the trade embargo itself. While the 
normalization of relations with Cuba is a good starting point for such 
action, Congress will need to repeal the embargo, and the President 
may not act alone. 
More importantly, however, is that Major League Baseball’s re-
sponse is alarming. Calling to the legislators to provide evidence 
that “Cuban players must rely on human traffickers to” escape 
demonstrates that MLB has continued to turn a blind eye to the hor-
rific circumstances in which player’s endure in order to leave the 
island. Two high profile cases, of which MLB is certainly aware, 
involving Cuban MLB players and human trafficking provide evi-
dence of what appears to be a sophisticated, dangerous, and illegal 
human-trafficking culture involving baseball players form Cuba. 
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B. Scholarly Publications 
Prior to the announcement to normalize relations between the 
United States and Cuba, there have been a number of ways sug-
gested to potentially fix the current turmoil involving Cuban players, 
some which are still viable and could be sought further due to the 
normalized relations. One publication states that even though the re-
lations are being normalized, as long as the embargo is in effect, it 
will remain illegal for Major League teams to scout and sign players 
in Cuba.277 Moreover, just because the governments are seeking to 
normalize relations, there still must be a lot of things done by the 
respective governments, the MLB, and Cuban baseball.278 
1. Eliminating Foreign-Residency Rule 
An MLB official raised the possibility of eliminating the for-
eign-residency rule, which theoretically would eradicate organiza-
tions such as the Zetas from involving themselves in ballplayer 
smuggling.279 This presumes that the U.S.-based criminals who par-
take in the human trafficking will be any less dangerous or harmful 
than those from other countries.280 Also, because leaving Cuba for 
countries like Mexico or Haiti is easier than moving directly to the 
United States, immigration to these countries may be preferred ra-
ther than being caught by the U.S. Coast Guard.281 
2. Lower Monetary Incentive 
Another possible solution is to simply lower the money offered 
to Cuban baseball players, which could disincentive the larger scale 
enterprises from continued involvement in ballplayer smuggling.282 
This approach could also directly target the sports agents and scouts 
who work out the details of the contracts with the smugglers pre-
sumably with no regard for the morality of the dangerous procedures 
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involved in escaping the island.283 Since the Cuban talent has really 
exploded since 2009, the free agents are a hot commodity and sports 
agents will do anything in their power to contract with ball players, 
but if the bar is lowered then there is less potential for corruption by 
the agents. For example, agents and scouts are attending the Cuban 
player showcases in countries such as Mexico even though they 
know very well that the nature with which the baseball players made 
it to Mexico and living conditions are corrupt and inhumane. If the 
MLB attacks the agents directly, they essentially have nothing to 
lose. 
3. Four Part Method 
One author, Matthew Greller, suggests a four-part method to-
ward improving U.S.-Cuba relations through baseball diplomacy, 
which includes incorporating Cubans into the amateur draft.284 Grel-
ler requires: 1) the MLB, the United States, and Cuba to abolish their 
exclusionary procedures; 2) then the MLB must change Rule 4(a) 
and Rule 3(a)(1) to enable Cubans to participate in the amateur draft; 
3) next the MLB should impose a reasonable tax on teams that sign 
Cuban players in order to support Cuban scouting and infrastructure; 
and 4) finally, the U.S. needs to amend existing immigration laws to 
permit Cubans to play professional baseball in America without be-
ing forced to flee the country.285 
4. Worldwide Draft 
Another writer, Scott Cwiertny, proposed that the MLB should 
adopt a worldwide draft consisting of players of foreign resi-
dency.286 This would have considerable effects on Cuban players by 
abolishing free agency status for the Cubans.287 A worldwide draft 
would lower the monetary incentives for agents and scouts to ag-
gressively and unlawfully pursue players in Cuba.288 Also, the end 
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of free agency would remove bidding wars for Cuban free agents 
who live outside the United States and diminish agents’ motivation 
for inflating players’ abilities in order to tempt them to escape the 
country. Lastly, this would lower the temptation for MLB scouts to 
breach the Kuhn Directive and the current embargo.289 However, 
two major issues stem from this possible solution. For one, it is un-
clear whether the Cuban government would be completely open to 
handing its players over to the MLB.290 The Cuban baseball com-
missioner explains, “The Cuban people have invested in their base-
ball players and no one has the right to take them away.”291 Addi-
tionally, the sports agents would have little incentive to assist in the 
escape of Cuba ball players because they would earn a lower salary 
than they would have as free agents, and any agent breaching the 
Cuban embargo would face severe penalties.292 
5. Worldwide Draft – Excluding Cuba 
Another alternative proposed by Rick Lopez would be to have a 
worldwide draft but exclude Cuba entirely.293 Lopez believes the ac-
tion to exclude Cuba from a worldwide draft would drive Congress 
to take action and adopt the Baseball Diplomacy Act.294 
Allowing the MLB agents and scouts to seek the Cuban talent in 
third countries is more or less passive acceptance of a horrible situ-
ation. The problem is exacerbated due to the ability with which these 
smugglers have obtained at a grasp on beating the system with rela-
tive ease. The smugglers have mastered the marine navigation, boat 
handling, bribery, forgery, money laundering, immigration policies, 
and MLB’s Collective Bargaining Agreement to figure out the best 
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way to approach and recruit players with enticing cash payments and 
promise of MLB fame.295 Unfortunately, many of the “potential pro-
spects” may not become MLB stars. After all this, the smugglers 
earn roughly 20-30% off the top line salary.296 
6. Cardozo Scholarly Article 
Anna Kaminsky wrote the most recent proposal, which follows 
the normalized relationship announcement, in late 2015.297  Kamin-
sky points out that a solution may not be possible in the imminent 
future.298  However, she suggests three possible solutions that the 
MLB could implement to mitigate any further problems related to 
the Cuban ball players.299  The first option would entail that the 
MLB allow Cuban players to enter a worldwide draft.300  The second 
option proposes that the MLB strategically support legislation.301  
Specifically, Kaminsky makes reference to a 2014 Florida state law 
that gives tax benefits to players who travel directly from Cuba to 
the United States and enter the free agency draft, but unfortunately 
the law violates the federal embargo.302  The final option for the 
MLB that Kaminsky offers is for the MLB to initiate immediate dis-
cussions with Cuba’s baseball leaders.303 
VI. THE NORMALIZATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH CUBA 
Clearly, there are a myriad of issues involved with the Cuban 
players fleeing for the MLB, other Cuban escapees, the people re-
sponsible for smuggling, the agents involved in recruiting, and the 
MLB itself. However, the decision of the United States and Cuba to 
normalize relations comes on the heels of issues unrelated to base-
ball. The decision to normalize relations came when U.S. contractor 
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and “humanitarian, Alan Gross,304 and another U.S. intelligence 
source305 were released from a Cuban prison after being held since 
2009. Also, eased restrictions began last month when Cuba agreed 
to release 53 incarcerated people it deemed political prisoners that 
had been released after an agreement with Obama and Castro.306 The 
normalized relations include a deal that three Cuban prisoners be 
released whom were imprisoned since 2001 for espionage.307 Un-
fortunately, some doubters exist. Senator Marco Rubio, believes that 
Obama is playing into the hands of the Castro brothers by relaxing 
sanctions without any meaningful commitment to change on their 
part.308 
A. December 17, 2014 Announcement 
On December 17, 2014, President Obama and Raul Castro made 
a startling joint announcement regarding the diplomatic relationship 
between the United States and Cuba. 309 In an effort to “promote 
more effective change in Cuba that is consistent with U.S. support 
for the Cuban people and in line with U.S. national security inter-
ests,” the White House explained that the United States will normal-
ize and attempt to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, which 
were previously severed in January of 1961.310 The efforts will pur-
portedly begin with a visit by the U.S delegation to Cuba for the 
U.S.-Cuba Migration talks in January of 2015.311 The United States 
will also seek to re-establish a United States embassy in Havana in 
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an effort to improve human rights conditions and further democratic 
reforms.312 
Central to the announcement were plans to lift the heavy travel 
restrictions to and from Cuba.313 The United States will expand the 
allowance of general licenses to traveling to Cuba to 12 existing cat-
egories of travel: 
(1) family visits; (2) official business of the U.S. gov-
ernment, foreign governments, and certain intergov-
ernmental organizations; (3) journalistic activity; (4) 
professional research and professional meetings; (5) 
educational activities; (6) religious activities; (7) 
public performances, clinics, workshops, athletic and 
other competitions and exhibitions; (8) support for 
the Cuban people; (9) humanitarian projects; (10) ac-
tivities of private foundations or research or educa-
tional institutes; (11) exportation, importation, or 
transmission of information or informational materi-
als; and (12) certain export transactions that may be 
considered for authorization under existing regula-
tions and guidelines.314 
Travelers in these categories may make arrangements with several 
airlines that will now fly directly to and from Cuba.315 
Additionally, the Obama administration announced plans to 
raise the amount of money—remittance—Cubans may send to their 
home country. Although previous action of this sort required a spe-
cific license, it will no longer require formal permission to do so. 
This means that Cuban baseball players may now send money that 
they earn from their contracts back to their families. This may also 
allow for agents from the United States to help support Cuban play-
ers in hopes of landing them as clients. For remittance, Cuban Amer-
icans may send their relatives an unrestricted amount of money, 
while Non-Cuban Americans may send up to $8,000 a year to any 
Cuban national.316 
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B. MLB Response 
Following the announcement of the normalization of relations 
on December 17, MLB’s Commissioner’s Office released the fol-
lowing statement: 
Major League Baseball is closely monitoring the 
White House’s announcement regarding Cuban-
American Relations. While there are not significant 
details to make a realistic evaluation, we will con-
tinue to tract this significant issue, and we will keep 
our clubs informed if this different direction may im-
pact the manner in which they conduct business on 
issues related to Cuba.317 
It took less than three months for Major League Baseball to take its 
first official action following the announcement. 
In January 2015, nineteen-year old Cuban infielder, Yoan 
Moncada, became the first player to apply to the OFAC for a license 
following the announcement.318 Moncada had escaped to Guatemala 
in August, and received a permanent residency document, a state-
ment from a Guatemala bank as proof of residency, and a Guatema-
lan Identity Card.319 Based on the previous MLB rules that required 
a specific license for Cubans to sign with a Major League team, 
Moncada submitted a formal application to the OFAC.320 His agent, 
David Hastings, received an email from the OFAC in response to 
the application.321 The email confirmed that the OFAC “will not 
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grant a specific license to Cuban nationals who are already un-
blocked via the general license.”322 In other words, because 
Moncada met the requirements of the general unblocking license—
he possessed at least two permanent residency documents from a 
third country—he need not apply for the specific license. 323 By once 
again altering its policies to support a preference for a general li-
cense over a specific license requirement, MLB, in effect, softened 
its stance toward Cuban nationals.324 Moncada has since made his 
way through the Boston Red Sox’s minor league system and devel-
oped into one of the best prospects in baseball today.325 
VII. MOVING FORWARD: UNITED STATES-CUBAN BASEBALL 
COALITION COMMITTEE 
The above-mentioned solutions do show signs of promise if all 
parties are willing to cooperate. Out of the proposed solutions, Ser-
rano’s Baseball Diplomacy Act appears to be the most promising 
and realistic one, but it has been a Bill since 1995 and has yet to be 
enacted into law. Instead of seeking a solution that assumes a com-
promise amongst various parties, establishing a committee to align 
incentives could aid in improving international relations and work-
ing towards elimination of this issue. 
Now that the countries have an operative agreement in place 
through the goal of normalizing relations, there is an opportunity for 
the ongoing difficulties associated with Cuban players to improve 
relations between the two countries and eliminate the unsafe proce-
dures in line with the issue. A workable framework could seek to 
enhance the safety involved with the process and increase the effi-
ciency of transitions for players who would like to escape the island. 
This would not be a route to encourage Cuban players to go to the 
MLB. Rather, it would serve to improve the morale of the troubling 
issues and reach a compromise with the involved parties. The goals 
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of this committee will be in line with the normalized relations dis-
cussions economically, socially in encouraging stability, and in 
terms of cooperation between the U.S. and Cuba. 
As the two countries seek to normalize relations, the baseball 
issue could be seen as a means of exacerbating the link between the 
two countries, but could alternatively be used as a platform to make 
the link between the two countries even stronger. Normalizing rela-
tions between the United States and Cuba can only do so much and 
will likely take years to have relations completely normal. In order 
to account for all of the moving parts, the negotiations could begin 
by setting up a committee, which will consist of representatives 
from: 1) United States government; 2) Cuban government; 3) Sports 
agents; 4) Major League Baseball; 5) Serie Nacional de Béisbol; and 
6) Liaisons on all ends to mediate the process, ideally from the 
United Nations Charter. The representatives would be able to nego-
tiate arrangements and provisions of the movement of players from 
Cuba to other countries to ensure the legitimate concerns for indi-
viduals who seek to flee the island, while keeping the committee’s 
respective interests in mind to align the goals of all groups involved. 
The liaisons will ensure good faith negotiations to maintain order in 
line with the United Nations Charter. 
A. Parties Involved and Representatives 
In order to ensure that the parties are negotiating with everyone’s 
best interests in mind, certain representatives will be assigned to the 
five groups on the committee, as well as intermediaries to ensure 
good faith negotiations. For the United States Government and Cu-
ban Government, current U.S. President, Barack Obama, and Cuban 
President, Raul Castro, have held bilateral discussions regarding the 
normalized relations. Moreover, U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, 
and Cuban Foreign Minister, Bruno Rodriguez Parilla, have held 
meetings in Cuba and at the Summit of the Americas Conference to 
discuss ongoing formalities involved with the normalized relations 
(i.e. setting up respective embassies). These representatives would 
continue to focus on normalizing relations but could be integral 
players in the resolution discussions. 
For the sports agents’ representatives, people responsible for the 
international relations on the Major League Baseball Player’s Asso-
ciation (MLBPA) Executive Board, who promulgate the Agents’ 
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rules and regulations, would be useful towards aligning the 
MLBPA’s incentives. The main group could consist of Javier 
Vasquez, International Special Assistant, Tony Clark, Executive Di-
rector, Richard Shapiro, Senior Advisor, and Leonor Barua, Associ-
ate Director of Player Services.326 
The current Collective Bargaining Agreement (full agreement 
between the MLB and MLBPA) is set to expire on December 1, 
2016, which could be a time for newly-appointed MLB Commis-
sioner, Rob Manfred, to execute some changes on the foreign policy 
front. Manfred should also be the main representative for the MLB 
on this committee. Similarly, Vice President of the International 
Baseball Federation and representative for the Cuban National 
League (Serie Nacional de Béisbol), Antonio Castro, would be a 
good counterpart for to the MLB representative. 
A recently implemented group could serve as liaison between 
the MLB and Serie Nacional, the International Talent Committee, 
which was created as a Basic Agreement between the Office of the 
Commissioner and the MLBPA in 2012 to examine a number of ar-
eas related to the procuring of international players, including but 
not limited to the exploration of the possibility of an international 
draft, improving the education and acculturation programs of Clubs 
at their international academies, and the development of appropriate 
country-by-country plans for playing and development opportuni-
ties for players prior to draft eligibility.327 Specific to Cuba in the 
current Collective Bargaining Agreement, the International Talent 
Committee “will be charged with advising the MLBPA and Office 
of the Commissioner on how to treat Cuban players under an ama-
teur talent system in light of legal and political factors that affect 
their signability.”328 The Committee consists of Manfred, Clark, 
Shapiro, New York Mets General Manager Sandy Alderson, Tampa 
Bay Rays Executive Vice President of Baseball Operations Andrew 
Friedman, MLB Senior Vice President of Baseball Operations Kim 
Ng. 
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1. United States Government 
The respective government’s involvement could serve as a 
means of ensuring that there is full transparency with regards to the 
international relations and continued discussions between Obama 
and Castro and Kerry and Rodriguez. The U.S. Government is un-
likely to be able to play too much of a role with regards to the sub-
stantive baseball involvement. However, the current economic em-
bargo in place does not allow Cubans to play in the MLB without 
first escaping the country. This could be an area of focus to reach a 
compromise for the U.S. Government. 
Moreover, it appears that the U.S. Government is likely willing 
to reach an agreement with other parties according to MLB Chief 
Legal Officer, Dan Halem. Halem remarked that the MLB asked the 
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
for a specific license in early June to enter into a deal with the Cuban 
government that will allow MLB to sign Cuban players.329 Halem 
went on to say, “There’s a willingness on the part of our government 
to end the trafficking. The White House has been very sympathetic 
to helping us end some of the abusive practices.” 330 
2. Cuban Government 
Similar to the U.S. Government’s role, the Cuban Government 
could use this problem as a means to continued communications be-
tween the U.S. counterparts. In the normalized relations communi-
cations, it’s been stated that Castro and Cuba do not plan on chang-
ing too much of their structure internally. However, even though 
Raul Castro is similar to his predecessor, Fidel, with regards to 
maintaining a passion for baseball within Cuba, he has made the ex-
ception to allow Cuban players to play abroad in Japan and Mexico 
so may be apt to a more lenient travel policy for Cuban baseball 
players. This approach remains to be seen in respects to the MLB 
but due to the precedent of allowing Cuba players abroad in other 
countries and continued communications, it is important to have 
Castro and Rodriguez on the Committee. 
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As evident by a December 2015 goodwill return of a few Cuban 
players, it appears that the Cuban Government is also open to utiliz-
ing baseball as a means of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy. President of the 
Cuban Baseball Federation, Higinio Velez, stated “This demon-
strates that Cuba is open to the world, that we are not closed, not 
even with our players who are playing in MLB.” 
3. Sports Agents’ 
As noted above, an area that could aid towards rehabilitating the 
issue is for the MLB to crack down on sports agents’ aggressive ac-
tivity towards the Cuban players. On the MLBPA Executive Board, 
Vasquez, Clark, Shapiro, and Barua would be the structural back-
bone to implement proper guidelines for sports agents in this area. 
Sports agents tend to have an unequal bargaining power in many 
situations and the discrepancy is exacerbated in Cuba where the in-
dividuals are risking a lot more by leaving behind their family, but 
could be swayed by the perceived promise of a life filled with ex-
travagance. Already, a few sports agents have got in trouble from 
taking advantage of the issue as indicated previously with the agents 
Suarez and Dominguez. 
The MLBPA Executive Board members that I selected have 
been the most involved with international relations, players, and 
sports agents. These members will also be at the forefront of nego-
tiations to changes in the Collective Bargaining Agreement for De-
cember 1, 2016. The Executive Board likely does not have to come 
down directly on the sports agents with harsh guidelines and it is in 
their best interest to be respectful of the norms of the field, but struc-
turing some protocol in the CBA with regards to the changes in in-
ternational relations could be a good starting point to develop some 
order. 
4. Major League Baseball 
Newly assigned MLB Commissioner, Rob Manfred, is adamant 
about an approach to creating a better avenue to link Cuba and 
America on the baseball front. Manfred is in a good spot to make 
some decisions right now as he starts out his tenure in a few different 
areas. With regards to the new CBA Agreement, Manfred will have 
a lot of decision-making power in changes to the agreement to align 
with the normalized relations agreement. Moreover, with the MLB 
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All-Star Game in Miami in 2016, just 200 miles from Cuba, 
Manfred could implement some activities involving Cuba in the 
weeklong event. 
While these are two areas where Manfred and the MLB can 
make stark alterations to the current ambiguous agreements, he re-
cently announced there are other short term and long-term ventures 
the League hopes to embark on. For now, Manfred said he hopes to 
stage exhibition games in Cuba next spring to advance the process 
of restoring baseball ties with the Caribbean nation.331 In the long-
term, Manfred stated that “[o]ver the long haul, we’d like to see a 
more regularized process for Cuban players to come to the United 
States and, if they want, return to Cuba. It’s really important to us to 
have the best athletes in the world playing Major League Baseball 
and we think a more regularized immigration process would help us 
in that regard.”332 
5. Serie Nacional de Béisbol 
Along the same lines as the MLB approach, the Cuban Baseball 
equivalent, Serie Nacional de Béisbol and its decision makers, are 
optimistic about pushing for closer ties with American baseball. An-
tonio Castro, son of Fidel and VP of the International Baseball Fed-
eration, is all for Cuban players participating in international 
leagues. In an interview, Castro said “I think our ballplayers who 
trained here earned the right to go play in other leagues and measure 
themselves against a higher level. They should be able to do it - 
without fear - and come back and play with their national team.”333 
Similarly, while the culture formerly used to be averse towards Cu-
ban players leaving their home country for the MLB, a lot of the fans 
enjoy seeing these players succeed at the highest level in the MLB. 
Castro states further that “the problem exists and [Cuba and MLB] 
need to resolve this. The question is, why not? Why don’t we find 
the solution? The only thing we need is the will to do that. For sure 
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we can find a solution, but we need to work together - every-
body.”334 With the Major League season being so long, allowing 
players to return during the offseason to play would not be ideal due 
to possibilities of burnout. However, Castro appears to be optimistic 
about discussing options to reach a compromise for the leagues that 
could entail a simpler avenue for the players and improving the cur-
rent system. 
6. Liaisons 
There are a couple of liaisons that could serve on both the base-
ball and international relations front. The aforementioned Interna-
tional Talent Committee can come in to monitor that proper negoti-
ating is taking place between the Cuban baseball and American 
baseball representatives. Also, as the representatives for interna-
tional relations in the current CBA, they could help in amending the 
provisions related to international relations with Cuba to align with 
the normalized relations agreement and ongoing discussions. 
The other group that could help monitor the entire Committee 
and specifically U.S.-Cuban relations is the United Nations Charter. 
In the United Nations General Assembly, the most applicable com-
mittees to monitor the Baseball Committee are the Second (Eco-
nomic and Financial Committee) and Third (Social, Humanitarian, 
and Cultural). To maintain order and to keep the discussion on the 
topics related to improving the morale, good faith negotiations, and 
improving the troubling immigration issue, the U.N. Charter will be 
a strong mediator to watch over all parties and the discussions. To 
keep the conversations in line with the normalized relations docu-
ments, the U.N. Charter can serve as liaison to remind everyone of 
the economic and social goals of each country. Also, they can help 
maintain security and boundaries on any discussions that get out of 
hand or are too lopsided. Chapter VI, Article 34 of the U.N. Charter 
states “the Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any sit-
uation, which might lead to international friction or give rise to a 
dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute 
or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international 
peace and security.” This clause could ensure that the two countries 
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that have had friction for over five decades will be on the same page 
towards the normalizing relations documents. 
B. Aligning Incentives 
There is currently no one-size-fits-all solution, but getting a 
Committee like this together involving the U.S. Government, Cuban 
Government, Sports Agents, MLB, and Serie Nacional could be a 
first step towards addressing the major platforms for change as the 
countries continue advancing the normalized relations. The current 
MLB CBA already has verbiage in place that is subject to change 
based on the political relationship. The document is set to expire on 
December 1, 2016, and more concrete language can be put in its 
place based on discussions amongst the Committee and in the nor-
malized relations agreement. Important areas to address are to ac-
count for players who do not end up making it to the MLB who have 
fled the island, improving the ease and access to the difficulties as-
sociated with escaping the island, possible events to improve morale 
between the countries (spring training and All-Star Game), and 
keeping both countries satisfied. The end result will not necessarily 
be for the countries to reach an agreement where Cuban players can 
travel back-and-forth freely to the U.S., but where both countries do 
not feel slighted and the process becomes safer (i.e. could be to add 
incentives/concessions for players to stay in Cuba instead of ventur-
ing into the escape process). 
The MLB and new commissioner, Rob Manfred, have a great 
opportunity to oversee all the relations with sports agents and create 
new avenues for Cuban baseball and the MLB through bilateral and 
unilateral solutions. Manfred could amend the MLB CBA on De-
cember 1, 2016 in regard to Cuban relations to align with interna-
tional relations as normalized relations continue for the better. The 
MLB is currently under a lot of scrutiny for turning a blind eye to 
these problems, so Manfred could play a big role in keeping the 
owners’, agents’, and players’ goals in line while maintaining an 
ethical stream in the enterprise. Manfred could also increase the ex-
posure for Cuban baseball in the US by having an international game 
in the 2017 All-Star Game, which will be played close to Cuba in 
Miami. The All-Star Game has decreased in prestige over the year 
as the MLB has attempted to increase it’s glamour by making it 
count for home field in the World Series for the winning League 
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(American or National), but the popularity has definitely decreased. 
However, the weeklong Summer Classic has various events 
throughout the host city. If the MLB and the Marlins leverage the 
Cuban influence in Miami that week - especially by showcasing the 
Cuban talent - players, fans, and teams will all be interested in this 
rising talent pool. Hosting a Cuban All-Star team vs. an American 
All-Star team could be included as a festivity for the week. The rev-
enue stream from concessions involving Cuban players/influence 
can be apportioned to the Cuban government. Alternatively, 
Manfred also would like to see American baseball in Cuba via exhi-
bition games, which could happen as soon as 2016 Spring Train-
ing.335 
All parties should look at baseball as a way to help the normal-
ized relations run more smoothly and not as a channel that could 
deter the possible growth of the relationship. In recent months, there 
have already been strides made. 
Notably, Puig and Jose Abreu returned to Cuba, their homeland, 
for the first time since fleeing via boat in 2012 and 2013, respec-
tively, on December 15, 2015.336 The return home for the Cuban 
players was part of an MLB delegation that hosted workshops and 
meetings with Cuban officials on a four-day tour.337 The trip oc-
curred at the one-year anniversary of the normalized relations agree-
ment and was made possible due to the thaw in U.S.-Cuban rela-
tions. 
The change in U.S.-Cuba relations did have an immediate im-
pact on the signing process for Cuban prospects as was evident in 
the case involving Moncada.338 Moreover, in September 2015, the 
MLB granted waivers for Jonathan Machado and Omar Estevez, 
who left Cuba but missed the deadline to register for the 2015-16 
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international signing period.339 Machado and Estevez were still in 
Cuba on the May 15 deadline, but, under the MLB’s collective 
agreement, the MLB can waive the registration deadline when an 
international prospect has a “compelling justification.”340 The use of 
the CBA provision marks the first waiver for Cuban players, which 
shows that the MLB may be opening up to the situation of Cuban 
baseball players.341 
There are even greater strides being made on the diamond be-
tween Serie Nacional and United States baseball.342 In November 
2015, the Penn State baseball team became the first United States 
team—amateur or professional—to compete against teams from the 
Cuban National Series.343 Albeit, the competition did not involve an 
MLB team, but the Penn State Nittany Lions had the opportunity to 
become fully immersed in the Cuban culture during the trip. 
While the college roster made huge strides with their November 
game, an MLB team engaged in a similar competition in the spring 
of 2016.   The Tampa Bay Rays beat the Cuban national team 4-1 in 
the landmark game, which marked the first time an MLB team 
played in Cuba since the Orioles played there in 1999.344  The week-
day game also involved a historic visit by President Obama as he 
became the first sitting U.S. President to travel to Cuba in 88 
years.345  While there were huge benefits an the historic game was 
largely positive, there was some negative resentment from Cuban 
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protestors, which signifies that a lot still must be done before the 
countries are entirely civil with one another.346  Moreover, this 
shows that baseball is serving as a large platform in the normalizing 
relations process. 
With that being said, the game is a large stride and opens up the 
opportunities for all parties to open up the foreign relationships even 
more. The MLB could utilize the game as a platform to continue to 
play exhibition games in Cuba or to increase Cuban baseball in-
volvement by way of the 2017 All-Star Game to be played in an area 
with a lot of Cuban ties, Miami. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The proper solution will appease the MLB’s view by being able 
to sign the Cuban players without having to deal with the negative 
publicity of the awful process, or, alternatively, allow Cuban players 
the option to have more flexibility in career endeavors. It will also 
bring the relations between the U.S. and Cuba closer together and 
please the Cuban players and their families so that they feel as 
though they have flexibility to go back to Cuba and do not have to 
experience a circuitous route just to play in the MLB. Additionally, 
the solution will appease sports agents by allowing them an oppor-
tunity to fairly negotiate deals with the players without any negative 
morality surrounding the situation. 
Regardless, the situation will take a while to completely miti-
gate. However, something where all parties are addressed could 
smooth the relations with regard to the countries and baseball in gen-
eral. In the short term, it is unlikely that the normalized relations will 
have much of an impact on the current procedures Cuban players go 
through to enter the MLB. In the long term, hopefully the problem-
atic system is something that can be smoothed out. 
“Knowing the history of things, I would think that baseball will 
be one of the slowest things to change, because it is such a major 
institution in Cuba,” Bjarkman said. “If they ever worked out some 
agreement on this down the road, well, it may happen eventually. 
But Obama announcing in Washington that they’re going to ease the 
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embargo, and [Raul Castro] announcing that he wants smoother dip-
lomatic relations to the U.S., that doesn’t mean the baseball situation 
changes.”347 
If the goal is truly to normalize relations, then the restrictions in 
place currently that are causing a lot of hardship on various parties 
should be relaxed. Setting up a formal United States-Cuban Baseball 
Coalition Committee will help with reaching agreements and taking 
small steps to amending and creating documents pertinent to the is-
sue. 
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